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Abstract
Networked public service delivery requires attention to
accountability and implementation in the public interest. Using
the case of transitional housing in a western US community, we
review the challenges of goal incongruence between network
members and the resulting management problems. In addition,
this case illustrates the role that local governments may play in
promoting the primacy of one network member over others
through collaborations, contract arrangements and nonmonetary
resources and the resulting political and judicial difficulties. The
complexity of networked service delivery is compounded when
the individual missions of network members supersede public
policy goals. In many communities, FBOs, as critical partners
in a social service delivery network, may face great variation in
expectations about how their organizational mission/faith relates
to policy goals. Effective network coordination demands that
each network partner recognizes and adapts, when appropriate,
to the differing missions/goals of other network partners.
However, when public resources are used to bolster the stability
of alternative service providers, especially faith-based providers,
governmental partners must maintain adequate oversight, with
or without the benefit of specific contract provisions.
Keywords: networks, transitional housing, faith-based organizations

Introduction
Mosher (1980, 545) called for attention to the “fundamental
shifts in the purposes, emphases, and methods of federal
operations” noting that “changes in the content of what the
government undertakes to have done and in the means by which
it undertakes to have it done have enormous consequences for
the content and the means of public administration, the principal
and indispensable arm of implementation” [emphasis in the
original]. Despite the increasing delivery of public goods and
services through businesses or nonprofits, termed ‘government
by proxy’ (Kettl 1987), ‘shadow government’ (Light 2003;
Wolch 1990), network governance (Milward and Provan
2003) or ‘3rd order devolution’(Wineburg, Coleman, Boddie,
and Cnaan 2008), public administrators, as Mosher forecast,
must still attend to the efficient and effective implementation
of public policy. However, as challenging as direct service

delivery by government might be, successful implementation is compounded
in nonhierarchical network arrangements characterized by varying levels
of formality and fluidity in the power and influence wielded by network
members.
Housing policy offers a useful case focus for considering the challenges of
network service provision. Efforts to develop and provide housing rest with
the for-profit sector as well as the public and nonprofit sectors. Competitive
and potentially lucrative opportunities in the private housing market do not
necessarily offer everyone access to shelter. Nonprofit organizations and
government have intervened to provide or facilitate affordable and transitional
housing in communities throughout the United States. Notably, demand for
social safety net policy such as transitional housing becomes especially critical
in high growth communities and municipal governments strategically create,
coordinate, and defer to the variety of transitional housing providers to meet
demand (Cohen 2001). In transitional housing, like other social services,
faith-based organizations (FBOs) and other nonprofits offer a tradition of
service provision and assume a significant role in the web of services available
to community members.
Webs of public services provided by a mix of organizations are generally
termed networks. Though network definitions in public administration
scholarship vary, Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 676), attributing this
definition to Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997, 9), suggest that networks
include “various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureaus, organizations) none
of which possess the power to determine the strategies of other actors.”
Agranoff and McGuire further extend the Kickert et al definition by drawing
upon Mandell (1988) to note “networks are conceived in terms of a cluster of
organizations, a purposeful whole, rather than as many different organizations
performing unrelated tasks” (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 676). Because
FBOs and nonprofits generally derive their impetus not from government,
but from their observation about community needs and gaps in assistance,
considering social service networks must move beyond “situations where
government officials intentionally engage networks of providers to enhance
the delivery of public goods” (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 10). Thus, we
consider a broader definition of network in which government may not be
the catalyst or focus, but may have a significant place in legitimizing member
providers with a substantive effect upon that provider’s ability to develop
capacity and to coordinate effectively with other network members.
Milward and Provan’s hollow state metaphor captures “the devolution of
power and decentralization of services from central government to subnational
government and, by extension, to third parties – nonprofit agencies and
private firms – who increasingly manage programs in the name of the state”
(2003, 2) and the means by which government cajoles (collaboration) or
controls (contracting) proxy efforts. We should recognize that while in some
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policy areas government has not been the impetus for social safety net policy
– as in the case of long-standing faith-based and secular service delivery – it
does play a significant role in stabilizing and regulating the service network
in communities. Whether or not a service provider orchestrates their efforts
in deliberate consultation with government, the service provider exists in
a particular service domain. Membership in this network is both self and
collectively defined and includes those who provide services as well as those
who influence that provision through regulation, fiscal support or expertise.
Those actors who are perceived as being legitimate, active and stable
members could be viewed as having primacy in the network at a given point
in time. Primacy may shift as members escalate or de-escalate in activity.
Some network members may lurk in a policy network, without a significant
delivery role. These members may, however, offer public managers options
in distributing resources. Because public resources have stability and broad
legitimacy, then municipal funding, formal contracts, and informal agreements
to provide technical assistance or other forms of nonmonetary resource may
offer primacy to a lurking provider and establish that provider as a preferred
option to citizens in need of help.

Faith-Based Organizations
and Public Services
Attention to FBO service delivery requires a historical perspective. In
providing a useful overview of the devolution of social service programs from
a federal, government-centric role during the past several decades, Wineburg
and his colleagues (2008) note that two federal actions are pivotal: Charitable
Choice and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives. ‘Charitable Choice’ provisions in the 1996 welfare reform law,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), facilitated government
contracts with FBOs via block grants (Chaves 1999; Kramer et al. 2005).
These provisions allowed FBOs to compete for federal contracts by exempting
faith-based organizations that seek federal funding from restrictions in
hiring based on religious belief or practice. Further, these provisions forbid
states receiving federal block grant money from requiring that “a religious
organization ‘alter its form of internal governance’ or ‘remove religious art,
icons, scripture, or other symbols’ as a condition for contracting to deliver
services…” (Chaves 1999, 836).
To extend the FBO role beyond ‘Charitable Choice,’ President Bush created
the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in 2002 to “identify
barriers to participation of faith-based organizations…in government
contracting” (Kramer et al. 2005, 2). The Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives intended to “identify and eliminate barriers that
impede the full participation of FBOs in the federal grants process” (White
House FBCI 2005). Following the federal lead, several states, including
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California, Florida, Michigan, Oklahoma and Texas have revised statutes
and regulations “to make it easier for congregations and religious charities to
receive government grants to provide social services . . . [and] . . . more than a
hundred cities have appointed formal liaisons to their local faith communities”
(Buntin 2004, 34).
The post-2008 election has not signaled a deviation from this commitment at
the federal level. In February, 2009, President Obama amended the executive
order that established the Bush Whitehouse FBO initiative to extend this
effort under the Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships. The
Obama Whitehouse added content to the executive order emphasizing the
importance of “preserving our fundamental constitutional commitments
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws and the free exercise of religion
and forbidding the establishment of religion” (Amendments 2009). While
Smith and Sosin (2001) caution us to consider that FBOs differ significantly
in terms of the integration of faith with service delivery, administrators
must consider whether and when the granting of governmental monies to a
religious organization might comprise a violation of the separation of church
and state.
The United States Supreme Court has evaluated this question in a variety
of cases. DeVita and Wilson (2001) note that while some perceive (and
prefer) the separation of Church and State to be absolute, there is a long
history of partnership between religious organizations and governments in
the United States including federal, state and local support of religiouslyaffiliated hospitals, schools and colleges. Recent Supreme Court cases appear
to have loosened the previous judicially-defined separation of church and
state by allowing “financial support for secular services on parochial school
property (Agostini v. Felton 1997) and [to] supply educational materials and
computers for secular-oriented programs in parochial schools (Mitchell v. Helms
2000)” (DeVita and Wilson 2001, 2). Further, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc, a split court expects that differential tests will be applied to
congressional action establishing religion versus executive branch efforts that
represent ‘executive discretion.’ While general taxpayer standing is sufficient
to challenge congressionally directed expenditures that might favor religion,
the majority opinion on the Court determined that simple taxpayer status is
not sufficient to challenge matters within the discretionary purview of the
executive branch.
The Court has continued to place restrictions on the use of governmental
money by religious organizations. Scholars note Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Mitchell, “government aid violates the Establishment
Clause if the government can be fairly held responsible for religious
indoctrination that is supported by public aid” (Lupu and Tuttle 2006). This
includes the provision that governmental aid “must not be used for specifically
religious activities, which includes programs with religious content” (Lupu
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and Tuttle 2006). These activities are generally permitted, however, if argued
to be either voluntary or separated in time/location from publicly funded
programs. Unfortunately, in their review of the Charitable Choice provisions
in the block grant programs, Kramer and her colleagues (2005, 5) note that
“faith content, separation [of religious activities from secular], and the degree
to which participation in religious activities is voluntary are not routinely
monitored.” Because organizational financial and client-based data are the
only information routinely collected as part of the contract monitoring
process, governments would learn about “faith expression or problems it
posed only by happenstance” (Kramer et al. 2005, 5). The challenge of
balancing the religious mission of the organization with federal rules regarding
separation of church and state is evident in the following lament from a
minister: “Watch out. We can’t do it all and they will want us to. Or they will
tell us we can do what we want ‘but just not call it prayer.’ But that’s what we
do - pray” (Withorn 2001, 113).

Networks and FBOs: Goals, Capacity
and Coordination
Questions about performance and accountability using government proxies
to deliver public services are illustrated with Light’s (2003) argument that
government by proxy may ultimately undermine the public interest in four
ways – through illusory presumptions about merit, the unified nature of
public service, capacity and accountability. The reality that people serving the
public interest may never consider themselves to be a part of government or
directly responsive to elected officials demonstrates the disparate identity of
proxies. Of the four, most significant to Light may be the presumptions that
proxied systems are accountable.
Advocates of alternative service systems argue that well-defined contract
arrangements ensure accountability (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke
2006; Kettl 2002; Milward and Provan 2003). However, not all network
relationships are dependent upon contracts and the nature of the contracting
parties does matter. Warner and Hefetz (2008, p. 158) surmise that “principal
agent problems are less likely with nonprofit and intermunicipal contracts
because these organizations have community missions similar to that of
government.” How can governments ensure that networks involving FBOs as
service providers are effective and accountable? Not all network relationships
are characterized by formal contracts in which performance guidelines are
articulated. Unfortunately, ‘faith’ in the compatibility of missions in proxied
systems as a mechanism to ensure accountability may be insufficient. As Light
notes (2003, 167) “one does not have to go too far down the accountability
chain to find mixed motives, diffused responsibilities, and general confusion
about who is accountable to whom.” Echoing Frederickson (1997), Light
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observes that “just because a private firm or nonprofit agency delivers a given
service . . .does not mean it is excused from worries about the broader public
good” (2003, 168).
Determining whether the public good is served by FBOs embedded within
networks may be methodologically complex when government evaluates
charitable choice and FBO implementation (Bielefeld 2006; Grettenberger,
Bartkowski, and Smith 2006). Networks are characterized by multiple
organizations that may be embedded in different levels or jurisdictions
of government; represent varied combinations of nonprofit or private
organizations and professional and volunteer staff. Within any given network,
organizations may differ in the laws and regulation that apply to them,
the fiscal years within which they operate, funding sources, administrative
infrastructure/capacities, and the nature of their missions. Networks require
entirely different management skills and often depend upon relationships
that that are informal, cooperative, or at least tolerant, of the efforts of other
network actors (Gazley 2008).
Huxham (2003, 405) considers all manner of collaborative effort and
suggests a major barrier to success is goal incongruence. Network partners
may differently view goals and may either assume shared purpose with other
partners or subsume their own organizational mission as an adaptation to
acquire resources. An entity’s goals may differ from, or even conflict with the
goals of other members of the network. Corporate members of a network
are likely to have a clear goal of maximizing their profit from the activity.
Governmental partners may have goals that are difficult to define or measure
(Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 40). Nonprofit organizations may also have
diffuse goals, and oftentimes have failed to participate in meaningful strategic
planning to identify their priorities (Wolch 1990; Fredericksen and London
2000). Faith-based organizations may have as their primary goal a religious
directive such as conversion of clients and view social services provision as a
means to pursue that goal (Grettenberger 2004). However, for a network to
deliver a service successfully, all members will have to reach agreement on the
policy goals of that particular network.
Aside from the potential to subvert the public interest by using public funds to
support constitutionally excluded activities, goal incongruence offers practical
challenges. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) suggest that goal incongruence,
whether overt or subsumed, leads to two main management concerns:
capacity problems and coordination problems.
Capacity, and attendant problems, includes areas such as contract oversight,
staffing, financial systems and the logistical and professional demands of
service delivery. As governments have increasingly turned to the nonprofit
sector generally, and FBOs specifically, to provide public services, concerns
have been raised about the capacity of these organizations to deliver services
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effectively and in the public interest. Kramer et al noted that “advocates
and critics alike expressed concern about the ability of many FBOs to meet
the requirements of government contracting” (2005, 5). Organizational
financial structures and reporting, staffing structures, governing boards and
employment practices may all flag capacity deficiencies (Fredericksen and
London 2000; Keating and Frumkin 2003). Potentially, FBOs have the
advantage of institutional structure with their associated religious organization
and may be viewed by government as having greater capacity than small,
independent, secular nonprofits. Unfortunately, this perception may not be
accurate within a particular network (Kissane 2007).
Like many nonprofits, FBOs rely heavily upon volunteer staff members. One
study reported, “only 6% of the nation’s roughly 350,000 congregations have
a staff person who spends at least half his time on social services” (Buntin
2004, 36). DeVita and Wilson (2001, 3-4) summarize the difficulties facing
FBOs who seek grant and contract funding by noting, “in many instances,
these organizations do not have the capacity to identify funding opportunities,
write proposals, manage multiple funding streams, report their activities
to funders, and deliver their social service programs.” The difficulties of
complying with complicated contract management systems were noted in
Withorn’s interviews with social welfare workers in the nonprofit sector.
“One long-time activist put it this way in 2000: ‘We want ‘our people’ who
live in the community to provide services. But all the contracts make money
management hard…they pull your contracts if you lack professional staff. And
then if something bad happens because people weren’t trained properly, or
paid enough, everyone suffers” (Withorn 2001, 110).
The capacity to develop and monitor the relationships within a network
is not only an issue for nonprofit organizations. Governments also need
to adapt their internal structures and operating procedures in order to
be effective members of a network. Project management, performance
measurement and oversight, and indirect financial management are among
the new skill sets required in network governance (Goldsmith and Eggers
2004; Kettl 2002, 500-501). Organizations develop practices and policies
to ensure accountability to their own mission and values. The challenge of
operating within a network is that organizations are forced to adopt a new
set of practices and policies and integrate the new operational patterns with
personnel and training functions. These new practices and policies, oriented
entirely toward maintaining successful relationships with the other members
of the network, take time to develop and may be inconsistent with existing
mission and practice.
Coordination involves challenges related to communication as well as the
management of relationships among the various network members. Kettl
(2006) notes that collaboration among a variety of partners requires a different
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approach than traditional hierarchical models of implementation. Maintaining
successful relationships with other network members requires skills in
negotiation and mediation skills (Kettl 2002; McGuire 2006; Thomson and
Perry 2006). Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) lament communication meltdowns
in referencing problems derived from personality conflicts or technology gaps
that might corrode effective communication.
Constituent communication patterns and preferences add to the coordination
challenges faced by organization personnel. Each member of the network is
responsible to its own constituency. Plausibly, each constituency may assume
their perspective and interpretation is obvious and shared, or may even resist
or disapprove of the network altogether. A government agency represents
constituencies as diverse as the clients it serves, the voters that support it
through their tax monies, the elected officials who monitor its budget and
its partners in service provision (as a partial list). FBOs can add religious
constituencies (e.g., congregations, synods, etc.). Nonprofit organizations
have as constituencies their clients, their donors, their governing boards and
their service delivery partners (as a partial list). A for-profit corporation has
constituencies including its shareholders, its customers, and its service delivery
partners. Each of these constituencies has differing motivations and a different
expectation about the content and means by which the public interest is
served.
FBO membership in local service networks is a significant consideration
for communities regardless of size, geography or constituent demands. As
conduits of overtly normative social prescriptions, FBOs may anchor (in
the most positive extreme) or pervert (from the most negative perspective)
the success of government-by-proxy delivery systems. This becomes most
significant when the public ‘seal of approval’ is vested with an organization
through formal and informal arrangements and they assume primacy in a
service network. The following case of a transitional housing policy network
in a high growth western community offers an illustration of a policy network
in which multiple actors with varied relationships to local government
coordinate and compete to deliver services and influence policy. Government
played a role in supporting and impeding efforts of different network
members. Members used varied strategies to influence government and each
other. Network members were both benefitted and constrained by formal
contracts. In some cases, government pursued and elevated a relationship
based on assumptions of capacity despite problems that accrued in clashes
between public interest and organizational mission. Following the overview
of the case, we illustrate specific implications of goal incongruence and the
attendant management problems and reflect upon what might happen when
government elevates one network member at the expense of others.
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The Transitional Housing Network
Figure 1 illustrates the varied membership of the transitional housing network
in Boise, Idaho. The majority of these entities have financed, influenced
or provided homeless services in the metropolitan area (with varying
levels of activity) for decades. In 1994, a formal collaboration between city
government and a new nonprofit was established to harness and coordinate
varied transitional housing services offered through a patchwork of agencies,
secular nonprofits, and faith-based organizations to serve a growing homeless
population. Boise partnered with Community House, Inc. (CHI) to develop
a model property for a homeless shelter. The $2.7 million shelter was federally
funded for the specific purpose of affordable housing, in the form of grants
to the City and a loan to CHI wherein the City purchased the property and
CHI handled operations. The 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between
Boise and CHI specified that the City would provide support to CHI in
meeting the needs of the homeless population; CHI would lease the facility,
but that the city would handle maintenance (Lupu and Tuttle 2006; Wylde
2005). This agreement further specified that if the City had concerns about
the operation of the facility they were to notify the CHI Board of Directors
in writing and give the Board 90 days to respond (Wylde 2005). Until 2004,
the resulting facility, funded with a combination of City support, federal/state
pass-through monies, and private donations, provided transitional housing for
homeless and low-income men, women, and families with dormitories for 66
men, 13 women, and 12 families. The low income housing unit contained 39
single resident apartments and 10 family units (Hem 2004a, 1).
Beginning around 2000, financial management problems at CHI became
apparent to the city as “funding decreases led to shelter staff cutbacks, which
then led to negligence in handling of cash, issuing receipts, filing tax returns
and other basic financial practices” (Hem 2004a, 1). By 2004, an independent
audit conducted for the City (the first since 2001) found “missing records, old
checks that were never claimed, payroll donations to United Way that were
never given to the charity, tax forms that weren’t filed and poor cash controls”
(Hem 2005). CHI also began to register compliance problems related to
HUD regulations. Boise, as the entity receiving the federal grant money, was
responsible for ensuring compliance. When the city found several instances of
the shelter failing to comply with regulations, CHI leaders insisted that some
of the violations were caused by the city’s failure to maintain the building as
agreed to in an original lease and that multiple agreements developed between
the City and CHI since 1994 evidenced various distributions of responsibility
on maintenance and operation between the parties.1
The relationship between CHI and the City deteriorated further due to
various financial and management concerns ranging from ineffective grant/
fund raising to noncompliance with Fair Housing regulations. In response,
the CHI Board tightened operations and removed personnel. Boise withheld
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HUD grant monies (comprising 25% of CHI funding) in 2003/2004 further
stressing the organization (Hem 2004c, 1).
In February 2004, Boise began formal action to revoke contractual obligations
with CHI to run the homeless shelter and in March, 2004, the Salvation
Army, another network member, entered into an agreement with Boise to
operate the facility for 3-6 months. Within a month, the Salvation Army
withdrew citing insufficient fiscal and human resources to address the
problems they identified at the facility (Hem, 2004c, p. 1). By June 2004,
CHI was officially removed and control of the facility returned to the City
(Hem 2004b, 1). Boise attempted to sell the building in July, 2005, but
abandoned this effort when the only bid they received was from CHI (Hem
2005, 1). Meanwhile, as early as May 2003, Boise had begun negotiations with
another potential provider in the network, the Boise Rescue Mission -- nearly
a year before notifying the CHI board of the City’s intent to seek another
entity to operate the facility (Wylde 2005). The Rescue Mission’s enthusiasm
to take over the facility is evidenced by a June 2003 email by its Executive
Director to the city:
Our Board has asked me to contact you to discover what the next
step would be to move on the Community House property. We have
developed a plan for managing the building…and are decided. We want
to make every effort to acquire the property (Wylde 2005).
The City temporarily abandoned the effort to sell the shelter and looked for
an organization to manage the facility. Pursuant to the backroom negotiation
completed ahead of the request for proposals, the Boise Rescue Mission was
awarded the contract to run the transitional housing facility in September
of 2005. Most recently, Boise sold the facility to Boise Rescue Mission
Ministries in early 2007 for $2 million (Kreller 2007). Market estimates
suggest that this amount was substantially less than what the City could have
received for this prime downtown real estate. In addition, the City continues
to assist the Rescue Mission with favorable terms on sewer-connection fees
and related infrastructure support.
Boise Rescue Mission Ministries, a Christian nonprofit organization, holds a
longstanding presence in the Boise transitional housing network, previously
operating two privately subsidized, single gender shelters, the Boise Rescue
Mission for men and City Light Home for women. The Boise Rescue
Mission Ministries also operates two other properties in Nampa, Idaho
(Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007).
Boise Rescue Mission Ministries includes religious activities as a core part of
their homeless shelter operation. Their goal is to “’help people at the physical
and spiritual points of need’ by providing, among other assistance, ‘Christian
teaching’” (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007). Among the religious
activities held in the shelter is a sixty-minute Christian chapel service.
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Another longstanding Mission policy is to segregate “men and women into
different facilities, and to segregate homeless singles from homeless families”
(Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007). So, upon beginning operations
in September 2007, the Mission immediately designated the facility (renamed
‘River of Life’) as male-only and relocated women and children. The relocated
female and low-income residents were notified of the new policy in August of
2005, one month before the formal transfer of the facility to the Boise Rescue
Mission Ministries. The City covered the relocation expenses for the displaced
residents (Brusse 2006).
Refusing to fade into the network, CHI filed a lawsuit in U.S. District
Court alleging 1) the City’s contract with the Boise Rescue Mission violates
the Fair Housing Act prohibitions on gender discrimination, and 2) Boise
Rescue Mission’s religious services, held in the shelter with attendance by
shelter residence required, violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise
2007). In December 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
ordered the Boise Rescue Mission to stop requiring shelter residents to attend
worship services. Declining to require that women and children be allowed
to return to the facility, the District Court did find that the former residents
of Community House could not be relocated near the residences of registered
sex offenders (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007; Hughes 2006). Not
content with a partial victory, CHI appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In November 2006, a panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the
District Court’s position noting that the City and the Boise Rescue Mission
must explain why gender discrimination “is necessary and justified” (Hughes
2006). Further, the Appeals Court, reiterating the lower court’s order not
to require attendance at religious services, also noted that even voluntary
religious services in a government-funded building violated the Establishment
Clause (Hughes 2006). Boise’s subsequent petition for rehearing by the full
9th Circuit Court of Appeals was denied (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise
2007).
In addition to the lawsuit, 15 separate discrimination complaints against the
Boise Rescue Mission have been filed with the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development by the Intermountain Fair Housing Council (Brusse
2006). All of the complaints allege religious discrimination, several allege
sex discrimination based on the male-female separation policy of the Rescue
Mission, others concern allegedly invasive searches of female residents and
perceptions that they had to participate in chapel to receive services (Brusse
2006). While HUD dismissed most complaints by the end of 2007, the
Idaho Fair Housing Council filed another suit in federal court on May 9,
2008 alleging that two individuals were forced to participate in religious acts.
Interestingly, the fair housing specialist for the Intermountain Fair Housing
Council is the former director of CHI, the nonprofit organization that ran the
homeless shelter before the Boise Rescue Mission.
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Lessons from a Transitional Housing
Network
In the following discussion, we consider goal incongruence and the resulting
management concerns in particular relation to a network incorporating FBOs.

Goal Incongruence
The central challenge inherent in this case relates to the disparate goals of the
organizations involved. Boise, a general-purpose unit of government, faces
homelessness as only one of many pressing issues. CHI, like many nonprofit
organizations, was formed for single-purpose action to address homelessness
and was ill-prepared for the compliance requirements associated with public
funding. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries is a Christian organization whose
primary goal is creating spiritual change in its clients through the provision of
social services. While governments hold the separation of church and state as
a value, the goal of the Boise Rescue Mission is not to separate their service
provision from the spiritual mission, but rather to integrate service and mission.
Another issue related to the differing goals of government and FBOs in
this case concerns the effect of the Rescue Mission’s religious practices on
shelter clients. Appearing not to have anticipated how the Mission’s goal to
integrate the spiritual and service provision activities might affect services,
the City was forced to defend, unsuccessfully, their decision to shift from one
network member to another. As in this case, many government agencies have
no effective mechanisms for monitoring whether providers are appropriately
separating religious and secular activities (Kramer et al. 2005). The complaints
against the Boise Rescue Mission include allegations of requiring clients to
worship before receiving services and preferential treatment for those who
attend worship services. Further, the worship services are held in the same
facility as the shelter. Although the facility was owned and maintained by the
City during the initial court challenge, its subsequent sale to Boise Rescue
Mission does not negate conflict with the establishment clause (Community
House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007) as even voluntary services violate the
establishment clause. The court’s findings in this case seem to be in conflict
with both Bush and Obama White House guidelines lauding voluntary
religious activities as entirely permissible. Whether the City of Boise neglected
to address these issues in their contract development or simply failed to
monitor the practices in the shelter afterwards, it is clear that the Rescue
Mission’s actions have made the City vulnerable to legal action.
Coverage of the Mission’s rationale for separating genders in transitional
housing, and the City’s accommodation of this policy, is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, sex discrimination is clearly incompatible with the public
interest. This discrimination, however rationalized by the Mission’s policy
and city compliance, suggests that the goal of the FBO in this case corrodes
government goals of equal protection, fairness, and equity.
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An important dimension to this case is the primacy afforded the Boise Rescue
Mission with the dethroning of CHI. With the initial contract to operate the
shelter property – the property conceived in 1994 by local government and
network members as the model that lead the existing haphazard transitional
housing network - and the subsequent subsidized sale of the property along
with favorable terms for expensive utility connections, the City of Boise
championed Boise Rescue Mission’s place in the network. Withorn notes
that when money flows to faith-based organizations there is a danger of “the
inevitable lessening of options for the many people who cannot abide overly
faith-based environments” (2001, 114). Allegations in the most recent suit
against the Boise Rescue Mission note that when an individual, ordered by
the courts to participate in a treatment program at the shelter, requested a
nonreligious environment, she was told that “because she had not ‘opened her
heart’ to Christianity her only option was to go back to jail” (Boone 2008).

Capacity
Managing effectively in a network requires that all parties have sufficient
capacity. The management of the contractual relationships is a central tenet
to successful network management (Kettl 2006) and several important
contract management issues contributed to problems experienced by Boise
City in response to its homeless. These issues led to legal challenges. Neither
the city nor CHI established conditions necessary to the success of their
original homeless shelter contract. First, critical elements1 of the management
contracts, including who would have ultimate responsibility for various parts
of the facility’s upkeep, were neither clarified in advance nor consistently
maintained in year-to-year memoranda of agreement and contracts. The
City’s role as both owner of the facility and overseer of compliance with HUD
grant funding regulations led to role conflict and confusion. Second, the City
did not maintain adequate financial oversight of CHI administration of the
homeless shelter. At least a four year period lapsed between financial audits
done by the City (Hem 2004a). Third, the City, not perceiving the need for
technical assistance to CHI, offered little guidance in helping the nonprofit
conform to complicated federal regulations and requirements (Watson 2004)
despite scholars’ contention that government contractors must maintain the
resources necessary to monitor contracts (Milward and Provan 2003; Sclar
2000). In this case, it appears that the City did not have adequate resources
dedicated to the contract oversight.

1 Information is drawn from
“Points of Consideration re:
Community House” provided
by Deanna Watson, former
Chair of the Board of Directors
for Community House, Inc as
an email attachment to the
second author in January 2007
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The organizational capacity of the nonprofit organizations involved in this case
offers additional lessons. CHI suffered from the common nonprofit pitfall of
an inadequate financial and accounting system (Keating and Frumkin 2003).
Episodic downturns in funding led to staff turnover and a loss of expertise
and continuity (Hem 2004a, 1). The Board of Directors, comprised of
volunteers with a passion about housing the homeless, was by turns inattentive
or overwhelmed by the complexity of the problems and challenges facing

CHI and surprised by the heavy fundraising responsibilities (Watson 2004).
Despite the well-documented importance of adequate training and support for
nonprofit boards (Houle 1997; Heimovics, Herman, and Jurkiewicz Coughlin
1993), the CHI board received little orientation or training. The Salvation
Army confronted its own capacity gaps when it backed out of its agreement
to manage the shelter after a short time at the helm. Boise Rescue Mission
Ministries, though appearing to have greater capacity to manage the shelter
facility, had difficulty meshing its Christian ministries focus into government
expectations regarding church and state separation.

Coordination
Managing relationships among partners in a service delivery network requires
different skills than those needed in the clear, hierarchical organization that is
best suited to traditional accountability models (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).
Each member of the network must devote time and effort to maintaining
the horizontal relationships with every other member of the network. Their
differing organizational cultures and staff/volunteer backgrounds complicated
coordination between the City and the non-profits charged with running
the homeless shelter. CHI was founded and partially run by advocates for
the homeless who had little experience or desire to navigate complex public
reporting requirements. The deterioration in the relationship between the
City Council and the CHI Board of Directors is highlighted in the Chair’s
comments to the Boise Council (Watson, 2004):
If we have lost credibility, if we are viewed simply as a bunch of radicals
who ran Community House into the ground, then certainly your
conclusion will be that the sooner we are gone the better. But what if we
are a group of reasonable people who was engaged in doing what needed
to be done? What if we did the best we could, that anybody could with
the resources, the partnerships and the time that we had?
Many studies have found that trust is a critical component of collaborative
relationships such as those found in service delivery networks (Thomson and
Perry 2006). In the absence of trust, relationships will sour. This appears to
be the situation in this case. Based upon published news reports, it seems
clear that once the working relationship between Boise and CHI began to
erode, the City appears to have worked to subvert the collaboration with CHI.
Boise began negotiations with Boise Rescue Mission more than a year before
officially notifying CHI of its concerns over the homeless shelter’s operation.
These actions were taken in spite of clauses in the original contract that
required the City to notify CHI of their concerns and allow a reply from the
Board. The premature, secret negotiations of the contract with Boise Rescue
Mission casts doubts on the credibility of the network collaboration or the
contract review process undertaken by the City to designate Boise Rescue
Mission for shelter operations. Finally, the City’s decision to withhold HUD
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grant monies that had previously comprised 25% of CHI revenues corroded
that entity’s financial capacity. In this case, it appears that Boise sabotaged
the CHI contract. Though scholars suggest that trust is critical in a successful
network (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Milward and Provan 2003), in this
case, trust had clearly broken down as the communication and coordination
of the partners in the network failed. Further, active network entities who
fell outside a specific contractual arrangement still played an important role
in the success of the entire service delivery network. Although the Salvation
Army and the Boise Rescue Mission were not formal partners in the homeless
service delivery network contractually, they were important players in how
those services were conceived and eventually delivered –they had influence.
Networks are larger than only those partners who have contractual or financial
linkages and latent players with the potential to assume primacy do matter
in providing options – whether or not those entities are congruent with the
public interest. Despite CHI being relegated to a lesser, latent role in the
network by the City’s actions, they clearly continue to influence the network
with their legal challenges to FBO service provision.

Conclusion
The case of Boise’s experience with transitional housing serves as a
troubling example of the difficulties inherent in a service delivery network.
Boise’s experience is not unique. Expanded use of FBOs highlights several
implementation challenges to networks that transcend the already significant
complexity of these nonhierarchical arrangements. Scholars are clearly
attending to network management and well-considered recommendations are
growing in this literature (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Kettl 2002; Milward
and Provan 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Effective management of the
network requires that each of the members understands and adapts to the
differing missions and goals of each of the other member organizations. This
includes nonprofit recognition of the more rigorous compliance expectations
that must be held when receiving public funds as in the case of CHI.
However, moving to FBOs doesn’t ‘lessen’ the need for public oversight.
In many cases, it may require substantive action for FBOs to address fiscal
or equity compliance or change religious activities to meet separation of
church and state standards. In the end, all members of a service delivery
network must create new kinds of capacity and emphasize coordination to
be effective partners. While the capacity for a nonprofit to administer and a
government agency to oversee is important, communication and negotiation
skills must be sufficient to coordinate network member responses to difficult
social problems. In this case, capacity was used as a rationale to shift network
primacy from CHI, a secular nonprofit facing administrative challenges to
the Salvation Army and then to the Boise Rescue Mission, two FBOs latent
in the transitional housing network. While the Salvation Army declined
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primacy after considering the reality of needed capacity, the Boise Rescue
Mission assumed primacy with confidence in its capacity to deliver coupled
with public subsidy of operations. However, as we see from this case, the
technical capacity to deliver services might be compromised because of
goal incongruence. Does government turn to any organization that has
the administrative capacity in a network without regard to whether goal
incongruence might jeopardize the public interest?
Federal
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Federal Housing Administration Homeownership
Fannie Mae

Nonprofit – Faith-based
Boise Rescue Mission
Salvation Army
Inter-faith Sanctuary Housing Services
Jess Tree of Idaho
Corpus Christi House

figure 1

State of Idaho
Housing and Finance
Administration
Department of Health and Welfare
Local government
City of Boise
Ada County
City-County Housing Authority
Nonprofit – Secular
Community House, Inc
Idaho Association of Mortgage Brokers
Ada County Association of Realtors
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
El-Ada Community Action Agency
Capital City Development Corporation
Women’s and Children’s Alliance
Boise Valley Habitat for Humanity
Idaho Community Foundation
Intermountain Fair Housing Council
Washington Group International Corporation Foundation

Implementing Housing Policy in Boise, Idaho
These entities, specific to housing, are among the resources named by the
City of Boise in its 2007 Action Plan submitted to the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development to maintain eligibility for transitional
housing support from programs including the Community Development
Block Grant, Home Investment Partnerships Program, Housing
Opportunities for People with AIDS program, Emergency Shelter Grants
Program and the American Dream Down-Payment Initiative. The majority
of these entities have been participants in regional transitional housing activity
(with varying levels of activity, latency and primacy) for decades.
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